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NOTES
The Patentability of Computer
Programs: Merrill Lynch's Patent for
a Financial Services System
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written lately about the scope of the Patent Act' and whether
patent protection is available for computer programs.2 Much of the discus-
sion centers on the economic impact patents would have on the computer
programming industry and whether patents would stifle innovation or stimulate
investment.3 Rather than considering computer programs as a class and deter-
mining whether patent protection is available generally, the United States
Supreme Court has chosen to deal with computer programs on a case-by-case
basis.4 The Court has denied protection when it found that the program
encompassed a mathematical formula which in effect preempted all uses of
the underlying algorithm,' and has granted a patent upon finding that the
program was an integral part of a manufacturing process.6 Lower courts and
patent practitioners are now struggling to determine how these cases fit into
the general theory of patent law."
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Blumenthal, Supreme Court Sets Guidelines for Patentability of Computer Related
Inventions-Diamond v. Diehr, 63 J. PAT. OFF, Soc'Y 117 (1981); Blumenthal & Ritter, Statutory
or Non-Statutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 454 (1980); Gorenstein, The Dual Standard of Patentability: A New Look at the
Computer Issue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 96 (1980); Comment, 35 U.S.C. 101 Claim Analysis-
The Point of Novelty Approach, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 521 (1980); Nycum, Legal Protection
for Computer Programs, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 1 (1978); Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights in Computers and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9 PEPPERDnE L. REv.
547 (1982); Samuels & Samuels, The Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions, 6 CORP.
L. REv. 144 (1983); Comment, The Subject Matter Analysis for Computer-Related Processes:
A Matter of Characterization, 27 LoY. L. REv. 1140 (1981); Note, Computer Programs and
Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RuTGERs J. CoMPuTERs & L. 1 (1977); Letter to the Editor, 62
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 523 (1980).
3. See Nycum, supra note 2, at 55-58.
4. When the Supreme Court considered whether a patent for a computer program is within
the scope of the Patent Act, it explicitly refused to extend its denial of patent protection for
the particular invention before it to computer programs generally. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 71 (1972). In a later case, the Court stated that it would continue to evaluate patents
for computer programs in the light of prior case law until Congress established new policy to
guide courts in this area. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1978).
5. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
6. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Samuels & Samuels, supra note 2.
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This Note reviews the basic theories of the scope of the Patent Act in order
to develop a general method for determining when patent protection should
be available for computer programs and inventions requiring the use of com-
puters. A recently challenged patent held by Merrill Lynch8 for a securities
brokerage/cash management system is described in detail and used as an
example throughout the Note in order to focus the discussion. Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, federal district courts, and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals are discussed, since they often conflict in the
area of computer program patents, and because the various methods of grant-
ing and challenging patents make each important.
In reviewing patent decisions, it is important to keep in mind that there
are several criteria for patentability, all of which must be met if a patent
is to be granted. Failure to meet any one of these criteria will invalidate an
issued patent, but courts will usually consider only the criteria brought before
them in deciding a case. The three most frequently discussed requirements
are that the subject matter must be within the scope of the Patent Act, 9 the
invention must be novel,10 and the invention must not be obvious." If a court's
inquiry is limited to whether the first criterion is met, it will not discuss the
other two. Consequently, a court can deem an invention patentable, or find
a patent valid, on the basis of a single criterion, only to have the patent
invalidated by a later challenge which raises other criteria.
This Note examines whether computer programs are within the scope of
the Patent Act and concludes that no single answer exists. Computer pro-
grams must be considered in terms of the purpose for which the program
is written. If that purpose falls within the scope of patent law, the first criteria
for patentability has been met. Determining the purpose, however, is not always
easy, as the Merrill Lynch patent illustrates. This patent will be examined
as a method of doing business, a subject long denied patent protection. The
patent is also analyzed to determine whether it can be brought within the
8. United States Patent Number 4,346,442, Securities Brokerage-Cash Management System,
is owned by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated [hereinafter cited as Merrill
Lynch patent]. The Delaware District Court has recently denied a motion for summary judgment
requesting that the patent be invalidated. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Paine,
Webber v. Merrill Lynch].
9. Patents are issued for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new or useful improvement therefore .... 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
10. Novelty means that the invention was unknown and unpatented prior to the application
for patent protection; if the discovery has been described in a printed publication, was invented
by someone other than the applicant, or has been abandoned, no patent will be granted. 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
11. The requirement of non-obviousness establishes that patent protection will be denied
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
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patent law definition of "process" for which patent protection is available.
Realizing that some computer programs do fall within this second category,
this Note addresses the issues of novelty and lack of obviousness, concluding
that few, if any, computer programs meet the requirements for patent
protection.
I. THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The Merrill Lynch Patent
On August 24, 1982, the Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office)
granted a patent to Merrill Lynch for a securities brokerage-cash manage-
ment system." The patent describes the data processing used to combine a
margin brokerage account with one or more money market funds, check writing
privileges, and a credit card.' 3 The patent can be described either in terms
of the services it provides for the customers or as a computer program, 4
making the nature of the protected invention unclear. Because the characteriza-
tion of an invention can have a decided impact on patentability,15 it is impor-
tant to recognize and deal with both possibilities.' 6
The abstract of the Merrill Lynch patent reads: "Data processing for an
improved securities brokerage/cash management system supervises, implements
12. Merrill Lynch markets this system under the trademark Cash Management Account (CMA).
13. Merrill Lynch offers this combination of services to individuals willing to invest $20,000
or more. MEaRuu LYNCH, PiERCE, FENNER & SmrrH, INC., THE MoRE You D~nmwN oF Your
MOCEY, THE MoRE You NEED CMA, (1982). Each customer, or subscriber, chooses whether
to purchase securities, place money in one or more of the money market funds available, or
use a combination of the two. Interest paid on the securities is placed in a cash account, which
is periodically re-invested in the money market fund(s) designated by the client, in order to earn
additional interest. Based on the value of these accounts (cash, money market, and securities),
the subscriber is permitted to write checks, make credit card expenditures, and obtain cash. The
assets in the accounts are used to cover these expenditures. When a subscriber wishes to purchase
additional securities, he or she may do so by depositing the necessary funds; otherwise Merrill
Lynch will automatically deduct the required amount from their cash and money market ac-
counts, respectively.
14. The abstract of the Merrill Lynch patent describes the subject matter as data processing
for the combination of services. "Data processing" is a generic term for computing used in
business. C. MEEK, GLOSSARY OF CoMtUiNG TERMNOLOGY 65 (1972). It is "[a]ny operation
... on data.., in accordance with a specified or implied set of rules .... ." M. WVEr, STAN-
DAR DIcTIoNARY oF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION PROCEssING 112 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). The pat-
ent contains a flow chart and generalized instructions for operating the management system.
Although not providing specific machine language, the patent does provide general instructions
for a machine or machines, and therefore can be construed as claiming a computer program.
15. The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that patentability depends on the Court's
characterization of a patent in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 n.15 (1981). The dissenting
Justices agreed. Id. at 206-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Note, supra note 2.
16. The Delaware District Court has held that the Merrill Lynch patent should be analyzed
as a computer program, a holding which it believes requires the court to focus on a method
for operating a machine. Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F.Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del.
1983). This Note disagrees with both aspects of the court's holding and believes the United States
Supreme Court would view the patent differently.
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and coordinates a margin securities brokerage account; participation in one
or more short term money market or comparable funds; and subscriber-
initiated use of electronically responsive subscriber identity credit/debit media
and/or checking system."' 7 This description indicates that the patent claims
a computer program, a machine-implemented process. No particular machine
is mentioned, however, nor is precise machine language supplied.
Later in the patent, Merrill Lynch states that "the kernel of the overall
system is a margin brokerage account," 18 indicating that the patent claims
a service or business activity rather than a computer program. This view is
further enhanced by the company's statement that the invention's importance
derives from the maximized financial returns accruing to customers from the
combination of previously existing services into a single package.' 9 In other
words, the invention does not so much further the art of data processing as
it does the brokerage business.
These distinctions and characterizations are important when viewing patents
involving computer programs generally and when considering this patent in
particular. The validity of the Merrill Lynch patent is currently being challenged
on the ground that it claims a method of doing business.2" The Delaware
District Court has determined that although the Merrill Lynch patent "effec-
tuates a highly useful business method and would be unpatentable if done
by hand ... the ... patent claims statutory subject matter because the claims
allegedly teach a method of operation on a computer to effectuate a business
activity."'" This conclusion is based on the belief that the purpose or product
of a computer program is irrelevant,22 a belief which this Note argues is con-
trary to United States Supreme Court precedent and patent policy.
II. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
A. Ideas
Patent protection is based upon a constitutional mandate to Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to .. .Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .Discoveries. ' 23 Early in
the history of the United States patent law the Supreme Court made it clear
that "Discoveries" did not include ideas, per se. 24 The Court reasoned that
17. Merrill Lynch patent, supra note 8.
18. Id. at col. 2.
19. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1362.
20. As of this writing, Merrill Lynch has survived a motion for summary judgment asking
that its patent be invalidated because it claims a method of doing business. Paine, Webber, 564
F. Supp. 1358. The court's conclusions can still be reversed through appeal.
21. Id. at 1369.
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
24. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 531, 570 (1863). See also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 62, 112-20 (1853). This policy remains in effect today. E.g., Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschaik v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
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"[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right." 25 Distinguishing between a process, which is patentable, and
an idea, which is not, is a difficult task.26
In O'Reilly v. Morse2 7 the Court presented a classic discussion of the
unpatentability of general ideas. The patent for an electro-magnetic telegraph
contained one claim of particular concern to the Court:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence
of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking
or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being
a new application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor
or discoverer.2"
This claim was not upheld because it was so broad it "shuts the door against
the inventions of other persons, [and] the patentee would be able to avail
himself of new discoveries in the properties and powers of the electro-
magnetism which scientific man might bring to light."2 9 Granting a patent
that would give one individual so much control over future inventions or
discoveries would be contrary to the very purpose of patent law, promoting
the progress of science.
Patents for computer programs present the same conflict. A specific pro-
gram can be protected through copyright, 30 but copyright protection extends
only to the wording of the program itself and not to the idea behind the
program. 3' Consequently, while a competitor cannot use one's copyrighted
program without permission, there is no prohibition against devising a dif-
ferent program to perform the same functions. Patents are sought in order
to provide protection for the underlying idea, 32 which would provide the
innovative programmer extra ecofiomic incentive to further the art of
programming."3 Full protection of an idea implemented through programming
could also act to stifle further innovation in the same way as the invalidated
claim in Morse and thus be contrary to patent policy.
Analogous to the situation in Morse, Merrill Lynch appears to be making
a broad claim to the use of computer programs to implement a combination
25. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
26. "The line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always
clear." Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
27. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). This case has been cited recently in Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Flook, 437 U.S.
at 592; Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
28. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112.
29. Id. at 113.
30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982).
31. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-14
(N.D. Tex. 1978).
32. Samuels & Samuels, supra note 2, at 146.
33. Id. at 147.
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of financial services. The company intends to challenge all financial institu-
tions that offer similar services; it does not claim to be concerned about the
computer program or other methods used to keep track of individual
accounts."' If Merrill Lynch is successful in its endeavors, it would seem that
whoever is the first to "computerize" a given technique, process, industry,
or service will be able to obtain a monopoly, not on the computer or pro-
gram, but on the technique, process, industry, or service. Such a result would
extend patent protection beyond the bounds set by the Constitution and act
to retard, rather than to promote, progress.
B. Processes
Congress has dealt with questions concerning the extent of patent protec-
tion and the distinction between patentable and unpatentable subject matter
by listing those things which are eligible for protection. Patents are thus
available for "any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."3 The term
"process" is relatively new to the Patent Act, although the concept of pro-
tecting processes by patent is not. "Process" is defined in the Patent Act
as "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 36 The term was
added to the Act in 1952, because it more clearly described subject matter
held patentable by the courts than the term "art" which was used previously. 7
C. Methods of Doing Business
Treatise writers and practitioners sometimes explain the courts' distinctions
between patentable and unpatentable subject matter by adopting or creating
labels for general subject categories and by describing the entire category as
either patentable or outside the scope of the Patent Act. A result of such
categorization is the inclusion of "methods of doing business" in non-
patentable subject matter. Although this term has no clear definition, a review
of case law supports the theory that methods of carrying out a business ac-
tivity are unpatentable because they are concepts which can be used to preempt
entire fields of endeavor, rather than one of the possible techniques for per-
forming a specific task.
38
34. Salmans, Merrill Will License C.M.A. Account, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at D-4.
See also Dunnan, One-Stop Money Management, SAvvy, March 1983, at 34.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
36. 35 U.S.C. §100(b) (1982).
37. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich, J., dissenting) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977). Judge Rich helped draft the amendment. Id. at n.1. See also 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 101 (West 1954) (background and historical comments).
38. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has been asked to clarify its approach to
this category of claims on more than one occasion, but has declined the request. See, e.g., In
[Vol.59:633
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Even though its exact parameters are unclear, the term "methods of doing
business" is important when discussing computer programs generally and the
Merrill Lynch patent in particular. It is Merrill Lynch's business to provide
financial services. Each individual service offered through the securities
brokerage/cash management system has been available from various finan-
cial institutions for some time. 39 Indeed, the services have even been offered,
albeit not as a package, through single institutions. 0 Deciding to provide a
combination of services, instead of or in addition to individual services, is
basically a decision about how to conduct business. Therefore, if this patent
protects the combination, it is arguably protecting a method of doing business.
The same result is reached if the patent is regarded as protecting data pro-
cessing and is given the breadth Merrill Lynch requests. Merrill Lynch appears
to claim that this combination of services cannot be offered as a package
without violating its patent." It is difficult to believe that there is only one
technique for processing the necessary information, given the abundance of
both programs and equipment available today. Therefore, Merrill Lynch must
be claiming the right to regulate the use of computers to perform these par-
ticular functions. Again, the use of computers rather than hand-kept ledgers
seems to be a difference in method, indicating that the invention claimed a
method of doing business. 2
As early as 1908, the Second Circuit noted that a "system of transacting
business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system is not
.. .an art [process]."4 3 In Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.,
the court of appeals invalidated a patent describing a system for verifying
the items served and prices charged by waiters and cashiers in order to pre-
vent employee fraud in restaurants.44 The Second Circuit characterized the
patent claims as "simply a system of bookkeeping made applicable to the
re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934). It has been stated that a " 'system' or method
of transacting business is not [a process], nor does it come within any other designation of patent-
able subject matter." I A. DELLER, DELLER'S VALKER ON PATENTS § 26 (2d ed. 1964). There
is a clear distinction, however, between such a system and "the physical means of conducting
the system." Id. Another writer contends that although business methods are "seemingly within
the class of a process or method," the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure proclaims them
outside that class. 1 P. RoSEaNERo, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTAlS § 6.02(3) (2d ed. rev. 1984).
39. Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Del. 1983).
40. Commercial banks, which offer the banking services involved, have offered brokerage
services for several years. See Note, The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84
YALE L.J. 1477, 1477-80 (1975).
41. See sources cited supra note 34.
42. Indeed, the Merrill Lynch patent may be claiming a new form or variation of bookkeep-
ing, a subject denied patent protection on more than one occasion. See infra notes 43-47 & 78-82
and accompanying text.
43. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908). "Art"
is the predecessor of "process." Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
44. Hotel Security Checking, 160 F. 467. The system was implemented by a sheet of paper
divided into sections (one section per waiter) and individually coded order forms for the waiters
to give customers.
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conditions existing in hotels and restaurants" having a "fundamental princi-
ple. .. as old as the art of bookkeeping," ' 5 and determined that the physical
means of implementing the system were not new and useful." Leaving open
the question of whether such a system would warrant patent protection if
restaurants in general did not use any bookkeeping system, the court invalidated
the patent because neither the method nor the physical means met the re-
quirement of novelty. 47
This type of analysis, which requires that the tangible invention be con-
sidered apart from the business activity it enhances, has been used repeatedly
when scrutinizing patents related to the financial industry. In In re Sterling,""
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) rejected a patent claiming
a new type of check and checkbook. Although conceding that Sterling's
checkbook, which included both regular checks and checks designed to transfer
funds to a savings account, was "an ingenious and convenient arrangement," 9
the court refused patent protection because the physical structure presented
no novelty.50 Finding that "patentable novelty cannot be predicated upon print-
ing alone," the court also denied claims covering the checks."
During the same year, the CCPA also denied patent protection to a system
for buying and selling commodities without the aid of brokers in In re Wait.2
The process involved three functions: transmitting offers to buy or sell to
distant locations where interested parties could see the offers posted, trans-
mitting acceptances, and recording each transaction. 3 These claims were re-
jected because the method presented no novelty, consisting of nothing more
than the "essential steps in all dealings of this nature. '" '
Hotel Security Checking, Sterling, and Wait indicate that innovative finan-
cial services are not, in and of themselves, patentable; they are methods of
doing business. Assuming arguendo that Merrill Lynch has patented a unique
combination of services, the patent is still invalid. The services offered by
Merrill Lynch may be easily analogized to those specifically denied protection
in these early cases.
Like the system for verifying receipts rejected in Hotel Security Checking,
the data processing claimed by Merrill Lynch is essentially a system of book-
45. Id. at 469.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 472.
48. 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1934). This case was decided on the basis of In re Dixon, 44
F.2d 881 (C.C.P.A. 1930), a cursory opinion which declared a new form of promissory note
outside the scope of patent law. Dixon relied on Hotel Security Checking.
49. Sterling, 70 F.2d at 911.
50. Id. at 912.
51. Id.
52. 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
53. This is the same general principle, albeit using more rudimentary equipment, which allows
two computers to communicate even though separated by several miles.
54. Wait, 73 F.2d at 983. The claim was amended to include apparatus, but this was rejected
because it had not been properly filed. Id.
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keeping to keep track of individual accounts and ensure appropriate entries
are made each time a customer deposits or withdraws refunds, or earns in-
terest or dividends. The checkwriting aspect of the Merrill Lynch system is
reminiscent of the checks and checkbook rejected in Sterling; even though
the ability to transfer funds among various accounts and to draw on one's
margin brokerage account through a single system may be "an ingenious and
convenient arrangement," the "arrangement" or combination is not patent-
able. By the same token, Wait indicates that Merrill Lynch will lose its patent,
since the data processing seems to do nothing more than perform the necessary
steps for manipulating brokerage accounts, money market funds, and demand
accounts.
In re Wait, is also interesting because the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals declined a request to clarify its views on the patentability of business
methods." Later, in In re Patton, the CCPA reiterated, without explanation,
the thesis that methods of doing business are not within the meaning of "art"
(now "process") as used in the Patent Act . The patent in question claimed
a national system for fighting fires which included standardized equipment
that could be moved from one locale to another. The court used the same
approach taken in earlier cases, looking at the various claims and aspects of
the patent and disregarding completely anything considered to be a method
of doing business.57 In this case the fire fighting system was ignored and it
was the equipment, or apparatus, that needed to meet all the requirements
for patentability independent of the business method.
D. Competing Interpretations of Patentability
A court that fails to consider patent claims independently or that disregards
the purpose behind the claims would probably not reach the conclusions
reached in the cases under discussion. This occurred when two different cir-
cuit courts reviewed the same patent for drive-in movie theaters" and reached
contrary results." 9 The Ninth Circuit upheld the patent, characterizing it as
an arrangement of "stall-ways" and "drive-ways." 60 The court ruled that the
patent described an architecture or structure, and thus, as a "manufacture,"
fell within the bounds of statutory subject matter.61 Since the Ninth Circuit
55. Id.at 982.
56. In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327 (C.C.P.A. 1942).
57. Id. at 327-28. This approach was suggested in Hotel Security Checking, when the court
looked first at the idea and then at the means of implementation before rejecting a patent for
a method of bookkeeping. 160 F. at 469. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. It is
also the approach taken by the Supreme Court when discussing general process claims. See Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), discussed infra note 167-89 and accompanying text.
58. Hollings head patent, No. 1,909,537.
59. Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949);
Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Rogers, 130 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1942).
60. Park-In Theatres v. Rogers, 130 F.2d at 746.
61. Id. at 747.
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did not address other issues of patentability, such as novelty and prior art, 6 2
it left the door open for the First Circuit to invalidate the same patent seven
years later. 63 In its consideration, the First Circuit separated the means of
structuring the theater from the general idea of conducting the movie business
outdoors. 6 The court found that the latter, although novel, was a method
of doing business and not patentable; the former was patentable subject matter,
but not novel. 6" Accordingly, the patent was held invalid. 6 6
Various members of the same court may take different approaches. In In
re Howard,67 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reviewed a patent
request for a system that eliminated the need to put price tags on every item
sold in a store. The patent claims included coding each product sold, storing
price information (by code) in a central memory, and transmitting price data
to the cash register when the cashier keyed in code numbers for the items
sold. The Patent Board of Appeals rejected Howard's claims on two grounds:
unpatentability of methods of doing business and lack of novelty." The CCPA
unanimously affirmed the decision not to grant a patent, although the members
of the court differed in their reasoning. Two judges compared Howard's claims
to sales by mail, in which products are listed by code number and price, and
found them lacking in novelty. 6" These judges declined to address the issue
of whether methods of doing business are patentable." Judge Kirkpatrick,
in a concurring opinion, characterized the claims as a method of doing business,
rendering them outside the scope of the patent laws.7" Two judges concurred
without comment.12
In re Howard indicates that even without reference to methods of doing
business, it is unlikely that merely streamlining and computerizing business
activities warrants the granting of a patent. By Merrill Lynch's own admis-
sion, none of the individual services combined to create the brokerage/cash
management system are new. 3 They have been obtainable either through a
commercial bank offering brokerage services,7 ' or by using different finan-
cial institutions to provide each service. An individual could perform all the
62. Id. at 748.
63. The First Circuit conceded that "the structure maybe the subject matter of a patent,"
citing Park-In Theatres v. Rogers. Loew's Drive-In, 174 F.2d at 551. The court then invalidated
the patent on other grounds. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
64. Loew's Drive-In, 174 F.2d at 552.
65. Id. at 552-53. The court compared the arrangement of cars to the arrangement of seats
in an indoor theater. Id.
66. Id. at 553.
67. 394 F.2d 869 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
68. Id. at 869.
69. Id. at 871.
70. Id. at 872.
71. Id. (Kirkpatrick, J., concurring).
72. Id. (Worley, C.J. and Smith, J., concurring).
73. Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Del. 1983).
74. Note, Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477-80 (1975).
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functions of Merrill Lynch's data processing albeit in a less efficient and more
time consuming manner. The withdrawal and depositing of money in the
various accounts, providing cash for purchasing securities, applying for and
obtaining loans based on the value of one's portfolio, and requiring that
dividends and interest be disbursed promptly in order to deposit it elsewhere
may all be done by individuals. Merrill Lynch uses modem technology to
make this series of transactions more efficient. But Howard indicates that
patent protection is not appropriate since the idea of shifting funds among
accounts is not new, and providing a combination of services may be
characterized as a method of doing business. This analysis of Howard's im-
pact on the Merrill Lynch patent is buttressed by the treatment given a patent
for an automatic bookkeeping system in Dann v. Johnston,7 which reached
the Supreme Court in 1976.
Johnston was seeking patent protection for a computer program that enabled
banks to provide customers with periodic statements listing the individual's
checking account expenditures by category (food, shelter, etc.). The claims
were rejected by the Board of Appeals because, among other things, issuing
a patent would have the effect of "grant[ing] a monopoly ... on a method
of conducting the banking business." 7 The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals declared this analysis inaccurate because Johnston was claiming
machines, not processes, and therefore banks could provide the services de-
scribed on other machines without infringing Johnston's patent." One of the
dissenting opinions decried this approach because the invention was a new
computer program, 7 and "[elvery competent patent draftsman" can draft
claims to computer programs either as a process or a machine system. 79
Without discussing subject matter patentability and methods of doing
business, the Supreme Court described the system as an alternative method
of bookkeeping for bank customers 0 and noted that customers could achieve
the same goal by using a series of separate accounts."1 The Court looked at
the general nature of the service " and rejected Johnston's application for two
reasons: the prevalence of computers in the banking industry and the existence
of a previously issued patent claiming a computer-operated system for track-
ing expenses by category within each department of a large business
organization.8 3 Both of these factors rendered Johnston's claims obvious.8 4
75. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
76. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 769 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
77. Id. at 771.
78. Id. at 773 (Rich, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Dann, 425 U.S. at 220.
81. Id. at 227.
82. Id. at 228-29.
83. Id. at 228.
84. Id. at 229.
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Although the Supreme Court did not invalidate Johnston's patent on the
basis of nonstatutory subject matter, it did deny patent protection to a business-
related invention. The Court declared that a computer program developed
to specialize a financial service (a checking account) was not eligible for patent
protection because computerization is an obvious approach to the activities
involved. In other words, computers and computer programs are now or soon
will be as common as ruled paper was in the days of Hotel Security Checking."
If a specially ruled page presented no invention in 1908, it is difficult to justify
patent protection for a specially designed program now.
The inconsistencies which result from determining subject matter patent-
ability by looking at labels such as "method of doing business" became ap-
parent in In re Deutsch.' 6 Deutsch succeeded in patenting a method for deter-
mining the optimum output for each oil refining plant in a multi-plant system.
The method used computers to monitor prices for raw materials, energy, and
finished goods, and to determine the optimal operating conditions for each
plant based on this data and plant production cost functions. The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals considered this an industrial process 1 7 and dis-
missed the notion that it might be a method of doing business. 8 The CCPA
noted that the system does not "merely facilitate business dealings" and that
"a method of automatically controlling a system of manufacturing plants"
did not become a method of doing business simply because computers
employed business data. 9
Deutsch raises some interesting questions about the term "methods of doing
business." Determining production levels is a classic business decision. Using
a computer to analyze the variables involved, rather than relying upon pencil
and paper or intuition, is simply an alternative method of making that deci-
sion. This observation indicates that Deutsch's process is a method of doing
business. 90 The CCPA, however, found the process outside this category of
inventions. 91 The court did not declare business methods patentable or decide
that they must be analyzed in a new way; it simple stated that the term did
not apply.Deutsch thus seems to limit the term to inventions relating to finan-
cial activities and/or non-manufacturing industries. The Merrill Lynch patent
will therefore not be exempted from analysis as a business method on the
85. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). See supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
86. 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
87. Id. at 692.
88. Id. at 692 n.5.
89. Id.
90. It would also seem to be a classic economic exercise, raising questions about novelty
and obviousness. The court, however, addressed only subject matter patentability, id. at 690,
692-93, so challenges due to obviousness or lack of novelty is still possible.
91. Id. at 692 n.5.
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basis of Deutsch. The combination of brokerage and other financial services
has nothing to do with manufacturing and has a great deal to do with
facilitating business transactions.
Generally, the invention claimed by Merrill Lynch falls within the classifica-
tion of methods of doing business, which has traditionally been held outside
the scope of the Patent Act. The data processing, or computer program, is
really a form of bookkeeping; it keeps track of each customer's transactions
and creates an itemized listing for each account. While Merrill Lynch uses
computers instead of pencil and paper, this is arguably the same type of system
denied patent protection in Hotel Security Checking92 and Dann v. Johnston.
93
Using a computer to perform these functions is not new; data processing has
been used by financial institutions and businesses for a number of years.94
Indeed, Merrill Lynch seems to claim that the novelty required by the Patent
Act is found in the combination of services, rather than in the computer
program. 5
A new combination of services, even if "ingenious," failed to provide the
required novelty for a checkbook in In re Sterling." The combination can
be characterized as a general idea, similar to the claim denied protection in
"O'Reilly v. Morse.97 Since no particular program or equipment is claimed,
upholding the Merrill Lynch patent would be tantamount to granting an
exclusive right to offer these services if any data processing equipment, or
computers, were used in connection with the services. Such a grant would
seem more likely to stifle than to stimulate improvements in either the ser-
vices or the data processing.
More recent cases indicate that predicting whether a patent claim will be
characterized as a method of doing business is risky and that using general
labels instead of providing indepth analysis can lead to inconsistent results.
Indeed, the Delaware District Court has found that the purpose of a com-
puter program, whether to enhance business or manufacturing methods, is
irrelevant, a conclusion inconsistent with the most recent Supreme Court
cases. 9" It is important, therefore, to look not just at methods of doing
business, but at the evolution of the theories behind patenting processes
generally in order to determine how to distinguish an idea from a process.
92. 160 F. 467. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
93. 425 U.S. 219, discussed supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
94. Dann, 425 U.S. at 227; Note, supra note 74, at 1477.
95. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1362.
96. 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1934). See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the case.
97. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), discussed supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
98. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), discussed infra notes 189-208 and accompanying
text; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), discussed infra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.
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III. PATENTABLE PROCESSES
A. Physical Changes
Early efforts to distinguish between patentable processes and unpatentable
ideas were based on the theory that a process changes matter in a way which
can be seen or touched. 9' While the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
this theory, 00 it has also clearly refused to "hold that no process patent could
ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents."''
Unfortunately, the Court has not yet established clear guidelines for deter-
mining how to distinguish an idea from a patentable process if the process
does not produce a physical change.
One of the earliest definitions of patentable process was developed by the
Supreme Court in Cochrane v. Deener.'°2 In that case, the Court upheld the
validity of a patent for a method of milling flour and described patentable
process as "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."' 0 3 The patent
in dispute described a particular apparatus that improved the quality of flour,
but the claims were not limited to the apparatus and covered the process as
a whole.' 04 The Court noted that if the process itself were new and "pro-
duce[d] an entirely new result," the machinery suggested for carrying out the
process did not have to be new or patentable.10 5
Although Deener granted patent protection only to those processes which
produce physical changes, the question of whether the claimed process is within
the Deener definition is not always addressed in judicial opinions. In Munson
v. Mayor of New York City,'0 6 the Supreme Court reviewed a system for
filing bonds and their coupons, which eliminated the recurring problems of
lost or stolen bonds.' 7 Expressly declining to decide whether this was a pro-
cess under patent law,' 0 the Court invalidated Munson's patent because books
had previously been used to file bond coupons.'9 Munson's system, or scheme,
was therefore held not "to involve any invention.''it
99. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876), discussed infra notes 101-05 and accompanying
text.
100. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1972).
101. Id. at 71. See also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978).
102. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
103. Id. at 788.
104. Id. at 785-86.
105. Id. at 788.
106. 124 U.S. 601 (1888).
107. Munson's system involved numbering the pages of a book or ledger, providing one page
for each bond or stock certificate issued, and attaching the coupons for each bond to the ap-
propriate page as they were presented and paid.
108. Munson, 124 U.S. at 604.
109. Id. at 604-05.
110. Id. at 605.
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This predilection for deciding patent validity on the basis of one of the
requirements for patentability, such as novelty, rather than first deciding if
the invention falls within the scope of the Patent Act, was seen in the cases
discussed earlier."' Even if Munson could be read as an indication that
transforming matter is not a necessary prerequisite for process patentability, " 2
it denied patent protection for a specific method of performing a generally
known business technique. Therefore, neither Munson nor Deener upholds
the validity of the Merrill Lynch patent. Deener would deny patent protec-
tion because the process does not produce a physical change. Since data pro-
cessing has been used to keep track of financial transactions for years,1 3 Mun-
son indicates that the Merrill Lynch patent is not an "invention."" ' 4
B. Performance of Functions
Time and advances in technology have changed the Patent Office's approach
to patents for processes. Machines now exist that perform important func-
tions without creating physical changes; these machines have many uses. In
order to provide patent protection for computer programs, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals now focuses on the fact that a computer pro-
gram operates a machine, the computer. The court feels that programs must
be patentable, since the Patent Act states that methods of operating machines
are within its scope." 5
One of the earlier indications of this view is the court's opinion in In re
Prater,'" which involved a method for determining which of several sets of
data contains the least amount of error.' As in Deener, the patent applica-
tion included both apparatus and method claims." While the method claims
were ultimately rejected," 9 the court chose to make some interesting observa-
tions about process patents and computer programs in general. The Court
111. E.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869 (C.C.P.A.
1968); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
112. This conclusion is negated by the line of cases discussed supra text accompanying notes
43-98; it has, however, been reconsidered recently. See supra text accompanying note 101 and
infra notes 133-40.
113. Dann, 425 U.S. at 227.
114. Today the Court might say it is obvious or lacks novelty. See Dann, 425 U.S. 219.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982).
116. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
117. The patent claimed a method for analyzing spectrographic data. Spectrographic data are
generally in the form of a diagram similar to a graph, which looks like a series of peaks. Id.
at 1395. The peaks are analyzed to determine the levels of concentration of the various com-
ponents of a mixture of gases. Id. There are more peaks or data points in each diagram than
are needed to determine the levels of concentration, and the applicants in Prater discovered a
method for determining which peaks contain the least amount of error. Id. at 1396.
118. Id. at 1396-97.
119. The CCPA found Prater's method claims too broadly written and denied patent protec-
tion under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1404, The court did not consider whether the claims involved
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 1405.
1984]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that computers now perform many
of the functions, such as "compare" or "compute," previously considered
"purely mental" and therefore outside the realm of patentable subject
matter.2 0 The court suggested that "process," as now defined in the Patent
Act, " ' included "purely mental steps," and patentability depended upon the
drafter's ability to define clearly the process involved. 2 Prater's method claims
were rejected because they were not clearly defined,1 23 but not before the court
summarily dismissed the Deener requirement of a physical change as dicta 24
and expressed the view that computer programs convert a general purpose
machine into one with a specific purpose.125
The court's decision to uphold the apparatus claim in Prater was a result
of this point of view. Rather than separating the method from the means
of implementation, 26 the court considered the claim as a whole. 27 This per-
mitted a finding that a machine programmed to determine the optimal data
points, or peaks, was not obvious, since "one not having knowledge of ap-
pellants' discovery simply would not know what to program the computer
to do.' 28 In other words, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals deter-
mined that computer-related inventions were patentable and that the machine
or program itself did not have to be novel or non-obvious provided it used
a novel and non-obvious idea or principle. This analysis conflicts with the
cases dealing with methods of doing business, which require the program to
meet all the requirements for patentability on its own, without relying upon
the novelty of the business idea.
C. Promotion of Useful Arts
The CCPA further expanded the definition of patentable process in In re
Musgrave,2'9 stating that "a sequence of operational steps [is] a statutory 'pro-
cess' . . . [if it is] in the technological arts. .... ,,130 The court believed this
definition of "patentable process" was "in consonance with the Constitu-
tional purpose to promote the progress of 'useful arts."' 131 In other words,
because technology is useful, it deserves patent protection. The court's ap-
proval of the patent suggests that the claims, which described a method of
120. See id. at 1402.
121. "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982).
122. Prater, 415 F.2d at 1402 n.23.
123. Id. at 1404-05.
124. Id. at 1403.
125. Id. at 1403 n.29.
126. This approach was taken in the decisions discussed supra text accompanying notes 43-98.
127. Prater, 415 F.2d at 1405.
128. Id. at 1406 (citation omitted).
129. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
130. Id. at 893.
131. Id. (citation omitted).
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accurately determining the nature of underground formations, were within
the technological arts. This decision provides patent protection to processes
that do not meet the Deener definition without overruling Deener and without
providing a clear definition for patentable process.
Judge Baldwin noted some of the problems this approach would create in
his concurrence, which strongly disapproved of the majority position. He
pointed out that the majority opinion departed from previous practice by
relieving applicants of the duty to disclose apparatus used to implement pro-
cesses and accepting instead the applicant's argument that his claims could
not reasonably relate to anything but a machine-implemented process.' 3 The
concurrence pointed to future problems, such as defining "technological arts,"
and concluded that the majority simply shifted potential disputes from the
subject matter to other sections of the Patent Act.' 33
IV. THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS: THE
VALIDITY OF THE MERRILL LYNCH PATENT
Both Prater and Musgrave imply that all computer-related inventions are
"within the technological arts" and therefore within the scope of the Patent
Act. They can be interpreted either as deciding that the invention is a new
machine (one having a special purpose),4hus avoiding a conflict with Deener,
or that the invention is a process for creating a machine. 134 By themselves,
these cases indicate that the Merrill Lynch program deals with patentable
material."' The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Prater and Musgrave
reasoning and seems to have returned to the Deener definition of patentable
process.
In Gottschalk v. Benson, 3' the Court noted that although it may be possi-
ble for a patent to be granted even if the process claimed "did not meet the
requirements of our prior precedents,' ' 3 "[t]ransformation and reduction
of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of
a process claim that does.not include particular machines."'13' The applicants
sought patent protection for a method of converting coded numbers to a system
132. Id. at 894 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 895, 896 (Baldwin, J,, concurring).
134. Although the Prater court upheld an "apparatus claim," 415 F.2d at 1405-06, thereby
indicating the patent covers the programmed machine, the process of creating the machine (the
program) is necessarily included. The Mtusgrave majority no longer requires the applicant to
identify a specific machine, accepting the program itself as patentable. See supra notes 129-32
and accompanying text.
135. They do not, however, indicate whether the patent is valid, because questions of novelty,
obviousness, and specificity remain. Prater was denied patent protection on the last of these.
See supra note 119.
136. 409 U.S. 63(1972).
137. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 70.
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more easily understood by general purpose computers. The claims revealed
a general technique which could be used to develop specified applications. 39
All uses of the conversion method were claimed in the patent; there was no
limitation to a specific goal, end use, or particular machine.' In summariz-
ing its prior opinions, the Court commented that ideas, phenomena of nature,
and scientific truths or their mathematical expression are all unpatentable,
but applications of these abstract notions may be patented if new and useful.'I
While refusing to hold all computer programs unpatentable, the Supreme Court
concluded that Benson had claimed an algorithm' 2 and that granting a patent
on these claims would effectively preempt an idea.' 3 Accordingly, Benson's
patent request was denied.
Benson indicates that Merrill Lynch does not hold a valid patent. The com-
pany's management system is not tied to a particular machine, making its
claims more likely to preempt an idea. Additionally, the cases discussing
business methods make it clear that managing investment funds is not a "new
and useful end."
Following Benson, which rejected claims for a computer program having
no application outside the machine itself, and Dann v. Johnston,' in which
a computer-operated record keeping system was denied patent protection, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals returned to the device of listing
nonstatutory subject matter, rather than defining "process." The list pro-
vided in In re Chatfield"" included "printed matter; methods of doing business;
purely mental steps; naturally occurring phenomena or laws of nature; a
mathematical formula and the algorithm therefor."' 46
In Chatfield, the court granted a patent for a method that determined which
programs should take priority when more than one program required the use
of the same piece of equipment. After determining that computer programs
should be analyzed in the same fashionas methods of operating other machine
system"4 7 the court found that the "claims, analyzed as a whole, simply define
a novel method for operating a particular machine system in a particular
mode" 148 and were not so broad as to preempt a mathematical formula. "9
139. Id. at 65. The Court noted that the technique involved the use of mathematics, which
did not itself require computers to solve. Id. at 67.
140. Id. at 68.
141. Id. at 67.
142. "A procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." Id. at 65.
143. Id. at 71.
144. 425 U.S. 219 (1976). See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this case.
145. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
146. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 159.
149. Id. at 158-59.
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The two dissenting judges found Chatfield's claims similar to those in Ben-
son and outside the scope of patent law."'
By defining computer programs as methods of operating machines, the Chat-
field majority would find them all within the scope of the Patent Act.' 5'
Although this interpretation complies with the statutory language of the Act,
it ignores the limitations the Supreme Court placed on the term "process"
in Deener. The Chatfield system performed its function completely within the
machine, prioritizing the various programs being run. Nothing indicates that
the end product reduced or transformed matter in any way.' 2 Since all com-
puter programs are used to operate machines, the Chatfield court would find
the Merrill Lynch program within the scope of the Patent Act regardless of
whether it is a method of doing business. If the court truly analyzes all claims
as a whole, rather than using the bifurcated approach taken in the line of
cases discussed earlier, it might even allow an otherwise unpatentable part
of the invention, such as the idea of combining financial services, to provide
the necessary novelty,
The CCPA did not, however, reach a final conclusion on whether com-
puter programs as a class are within the scope of the Patent Act with Chat-
field. In In re de Castelet,'" the court found a method for operating drafting
and milling machines through the use of computer programs to be nonstatutory
subject matter. Rather than considering the program a method of operating
a machine, the court looked at the end result, a drawing or a machined sur-
face which corresponded to a pre-selected curve. Considering the claim as
a whole,' the court characterized de Castelet's claim as "storing ... certain
mathematical data in a computer, inputting additional mathematical data,
causing the computer to perform programmed computations using [these] data,
and, finally, causing the computer to transmit the results .. .to a 'model
forming means."""5 Although the preamble to the patent claims described
the invention as a method of generating a curve,'" the court found that the
steps claimed solved a mathematical equation and sent electrical signals c~n-
taining solutions.'" This characterization resulted in the rejection of the claims,
150. Id. at 161-62 (Rich, J., dissenting). The dissent remarked that drafting a claim as a
"machine" instead of a "method" was irrelevant because "it is merely a drafter's choice." Id.
at 161.
151. Patent protection is available for "processes." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). A "process"
is a "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." Id. § 100(b) (emphasis added).
152. Chatfield's program was limited to "computer graphics systems and scan-conversion of
graphic information." Chatfield, 545 F.2d at 148.
153. 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
154. Id. at 1240 n.1.
155. Id. at 1244.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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since the court believed that the key to patentable processes was their prac-
tical application.' The court found that de Castelet was requesting a patent
on the equations used in his program, which was subject matter outside the
scope of patent law, and patent protection was denied.'" 9
De Castelet was distinguished from Chatfield by finding that the latter in-
volved a patentable process because although "it employed solutions from
equations, the method simply used the results of those equations, and the
claims were not drawn to an equation or algorithm per se." 161 De Castelet,
on the other hand, was claiming solutions to equations; 6, instructing the com-
puter "to transmit electric signals, representing the results of its calculations
. . . does not transform the claim into one using an algorithm." 62
Since all computers function by solving equations and transmitting signals
that represent the solutions, the real distinction may be either in the end
product" 3 or in the wording of the patents." 4 If the key is the end product,
the Merrill Lynch patent should be invalidated. Its tangible product is a periodic
report." 6 Since this involves making marks on paper, it seems closer to the
curves generated by de Castelet's program than to the intangible decision of
priorities obtained by Chatfield. On the other hand, if the key is the wording
of the patents, Merrill Lynch may prevail since it avoided the use of standard
mathematical equations when drafting its patent application by relying upon
flow charts and by using abbreviations (such as MMKT for the value of the
customer's regular money market fund account)" 6 instead of the more com-
mon mathematical variables (a, b, c, x, y, z, etc.). In either event, these cases
continue the tradition of confusion in the area of subject matter patentability.
The Supreme Court once again reviewed the question of subject matter
patentability in Parker v. Flook. "6 Flook's patent described a method for
updating alarm limits during the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons." 68 Alarm limits indicate when this conversion process is operating
158. Id. at 1243.
159. Id. at 1245.
160. Id. at 1243 (emphasis by court).
161. Id. at 1244.
162. Id. (emphasis by court).
163. The end product in Chatfield was intangible; the running of one computer program before
another. 545 F.2d at 153, 154. The end product in de Castelet was a curve, 562 F.2d at 1238,
which can itself be defined by a mathematical formula. See id.
164. The court noted that the distinction between statutory and nonstatutory subject matter
may "be fine indeed ... considering the glorious flexibility and frustrating limitations of the
English language on the one hand, and the ingenuity of patent draftsmen on the other." De
Castelet, 562 F.2d at 1243.
165. The system generates monthly statements (col. 4), prints a report if possible abuses occur
(col. 4), and generates reports required by the Federal Reserve (col. 5). Merrill Lynch patent,
supra note 8. No other mention is made of specific output. Computer programs are, in essence,
a series of calculations.
166. Merrill Lynch patent, supra note 8, at col. 5.
167. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
168. The catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons is a process used in the oil-refining
and petrochemical industries. Id. at 586.
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in an inefficient or dangerous manner; they need periodic adjustment during
transition stages such as start-up. 6 9 Flook's method for changing alarm limits
differed from commonly used techniques only with respect to the mathematical
formula used to determine the limits.1
70
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, described the issue as "whether
the identification of a limited category of useful, though conventional, post-
solution applications ... makes... [a] method eligible for patent protection
[if its only novel feature is a mathematical equation.]'"' The majority cited
O'Reilly v. Morse'72 as controlling 73 and adopted the approach taken therein. 74
Although the Court described Flook's formula as a "new and presumably
better method for calculating alarm limit values,"' 75 the formula itself was
unpatentable subject matter and therefore treated as prior art.' 71 Because the
Court found no novelty other than the formula in Flook's method, the pat-
ent application was denied.' 77 Justice Stevens reasoned that to allow any pro-
cess that "implements a principle in some specific manner" to fall within
the scope of patent law 78 would permit skilled patent drafters to circumvent
the prohibition against patenting ideas or phenomena of nature.'"
In essence, the majority looked carefully at the individual aspects of Flook's
invention. It used the terminology of the specific requirements for patentability,
such as novelty, to determine the purpose of the patent request. The majority
found that Flook was requesting a patent for a mathematical formula, not
a "process."
Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, argued that the majority had incorrectly "import[ed] into its inquiry
under 35 U.S.C. § 1011"0 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness."'' The
dissent implied that any claim that falls within the literal meaning of
"process"' 8 2 is statutory subject matter. 83 Justice Stewart would have held
that by limiting the use of his formula to a specific machine or process, Flook
169. Id. at 585.
170. Id. at 585-86.
171. Id. at 585.
172. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), discussed supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
173. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592.
174. This is the same approach taken in many of the cases discussed supra text accompanying
notes 43-98, e.g., Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1949), discussed supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text; In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910
(C.C.P.A. 1934), discussed supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
175. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594-95.
176. Id. at 591-92.
177. Id. at 588, 594-95.
178. Id. at 590.
179. Id.
180. 35 U.S.C. § 101 describes the subject matter patent law protects. Material that is not
within § 101 is nonstatutory.
181. Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
182. See supra note 121.
183. Flook, 437 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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had removed his claim from the prohibition of Gottschalk v. Benson"" and
was within the scope of section 101.'"1 While not addressing the issue, the
dissent implied, however, that Flook's patent might be invalid under other
sections of the Act, "6 thus raising the question of whether a "patentable pro-
cess," which is novel only because it "computerizes" a known process, meets
all the requirements for patentability.
Parker v. Flook indicates that Merrill Lynch holds an invalid patent if its
novelty lies in the fact that the margin brokerage account, money market funds,
check writing privileges, and credit card are all offered as a package, not just
through a single institution. 87 Because the patent claims an idea or a method
of doing business, the invention is nonstatutory and unpatentable. The dis-
sent's analysis suggests that Merrill Lynch is seeking protection for a new
way of operating machines and the invention does fall within the scope of
the Act. But the dissent also intimates that Dann v. Johnston 88 indicates a
lack of novelty, rendering the Merrill Lynch patent invalid.
The Supreme Court finally held an invention involving computers to be
within the scope of the Patent Act in Diamond v. Diehr.'s9 The applicants
in Diehr had developed a more accurate technique for determining how long
molded rubber needed to cure.' 90 They sought patent protection for their
method of curing rubber, which involved constant monitoring of the
temperature inside the molds and regular recalculating of the time required
to cure the contents. Both the general process of curing rubber and the for-
mula used to calculate cure times had been in use for years."' The patent
examiner and the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals rejected
the patent application, finding the subject matter nonstatutory.'ll Noting that
the use of computers does not render otherwise statutory subject matter un-
patentable, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. 19
A five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
CCPA to grant a patent. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, recalled
the definition of "process" set out in Cochrane v. Deener"'4 and the language
184. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). In Benson, the applicant's claims were rejected because they were
too broad, not tied to a particular machine or usage, plus preempting all use of the calculations
involved. Id. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
185. Justice Stewart defines the issue as "whether a claimed process loses its status of subject-
matter patentability simple because one step-in the process would not be patentable subject mat-
ter if considered in isolation." Flook, 437 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He comments
that this case is "far different" from Benson. Id.
186. "It may well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent should issue on
the process claimed in this case. . . ." Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
187. Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Del. 1983).
188. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
189. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
190. Id. at 177-79.
191. Id. at 177 n.2.
192. Id. at 179, 181.
193. Id. at 181.
194. 94 U.S. 780 (1876). The definition can be found supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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of Gottschalk v. Benson stating that "[tiransformation and reduction of an
article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a pro-
cess claim that does not include particular machines." 1 The majority
characterized the claims in question as "a physical and chemical process for
molding precision synthetic rubber products"1 96 that begins "with the loading
of a mold... and [ends] with the ... opening of the press at the conclusion
of the cure." 1 91 That a computer and a mathematical equation were used was
irrelevant to determining whether this process was statutory subject matter;' 98
the Court looked to the claims as a whole in making its determination of
subject matter patentability.' 99 The majority expressly noted that Diehr's patent
might later be invalidated on the grounds of obviousness or lack of novelty."'
The dissenters found the Diehr patent analogous to the patent before the
Court in Parker v. Flook.20' Finding the opening and closing of the molds
mere surplusage without legal significance, the dissenters determined that the
claims were nothing more than mathematical formulas, not entitled to patent
protection. 20 2 The author of the dissent, Justice Stevens, lamented that the
majority did not base its decision on the discovery itself, but instead rewarded
the claimants in Diehr for their draftsmanship rather than for any invention. 2 3
The dissent stated that "no program-related invention is a patentable process
under § 101 unless it makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent
entirely on the utilization of a computer. ' 204 In the dissent, Justice Stevens
also recognized that patentability seemed to depend on how the claims were
characterized by the Court.20 5 The dissenting opinion chose to describe the
discovery as "an improved method of calculating the time that the mold should
remain closed during the curing process. ' 20 6 Justice Stevens then argued that
there was nothing new or unusual about either the fact that temperature
readings were required or the equipment used to take the readings, and con-
195. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (cited by the Court in Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184).
196. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 185.
199. Id. at 188.
200. Id. at 191.
201. Id. at 209 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Flook, 437 U.S. 584, is discussed supra notes 167-86
and accompanying text.
202. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 210 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Blumenthal & Ritter, Statutory or Non-
Statutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 454, 505-06 (1980) for an interesting discussion of how to draft the same invention as
either a method or a machine.
204. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent equated "computer pro-
gram" with the term "algorithm," which was used to describe unpatentable subject matter in
Benson. Id.
205. Id. at 205-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority also noted the importance of the
Court's perception of the subject matter described in a patent. Id. at 192 n.15.
206. Id. at 206-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cluded that the importance of the method claimed rested with the calcula-
tions used to determine cure time.20 7
Both the majority and dissent in Diehr reinforce the importance of deter-
mining the nature of an invention when addressing- patentability. None of
the Justices in Diehr found that the method involved an advance in computer
technology; it was a process for molding rubber. The majority ended the in-
quiry with this finding, since the only question before the Court was whether
Diehr's invention fell within any of the subject matter (machine, process, etc.)
for which patent protection was developed. The dissenting Justices looked
at all aspects of the patent and determined in effect that it did not claim
a process for molding rubber, since its only contribution to the art of molding
rubber was computerization. The invention was a computer program, which
is nothing more than a series of mathematical formulas, an unpatentable idea.
The analyses of both the majority and the dissent in Diehr indicate that
Merrill Lynch holds an invalid patent. If characterized as a financial services
package,2 8 the patent is outside the scope of the Patent Act; such a package
is not a "machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,"20 9 nor is it a
"process, art or method . . . [or] a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material"2 1 as required by the Patent
Act. If labeled a method of doing business, the process is an idea and not
patentable subject matter." If, on the other hand, the Merrill Lynch inven-
tion is construed to be in the data processing,1 2 it faces the considerable dif-
ficulty of avoiding the Benson21 3 and Flook21 4 decisions, which indicate that
computer programs are unlikely candidates for patent protection due to their
mathematical nature.
CONCLUSION
New techniques for using computers must be analyzed according to what
they do. If the technique is used to process rubber or perform some other
tangible, physical task, it falls within the general scope of patent law. Tech-
niques for implementing services, however, are not statutory subject matter.
207. Id. at 207-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. This characterization would be favored by the Court in Benson, 409 U.S. 63, which in-
dicates that omitting to tie a computer programming breakthrough to a particular machine or
machine system makes the claimed invention an idea rather than a process. Merrill Lynch did
not so limit its invention.
209. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
210. Id. § 110(b).
211. See supra notes 43-98 and accompanying text.
212. The Delaware District Court opinion hints that there is novelty in the program, the data
processing, but is not explicit. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1363.
213. 409 U.S. 63.
214. 437 U.S. 584.
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The key to subject matter patentability is not whether a machine (computer)
is used, but whether the process for or in which the computer is used is itself
within the scope of the Patent Act.
Once subject matter patentability has been established, the other re-
quirements for patent protection must be addressed. Most basically, the in-
vention must be novel and must not be obvious. Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions indicate that these requirements should be analyzed by treating claims
relating to ideas or general principles as known or obvious, and not permit-
ting them to provide novelty. Under this approach, the idea of using a com-
puter is put to one side, and the technique for which the computer is used
must be novel and nonobvious in its own right.
Returning to the analysis in Munson v. Mayor of New York City,2" (in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a patent for a system of filing bond
coupons because the means of implementation-ledgers-were not novel), the
use of a computer to implement a new idea or the development of a new
program does not assure one of obtaining a patent. Just as books or ledgers
had previously been used to file bond coupons in 1887, computers and com-
puter programs have been used for a variety of purposes today. Mere "com-
puterization" of a known technique, then, is ineligible for patent protection.
LYNNE B. ALLEN
215. 124 U.S. 601 (1888).
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